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 Executive Summary 
 
Ever since the first general-purpose charge card debuted in the early 1950s, pundits have 
been predicting the “cashless society.” Over fifty years later, we may finally be getting close to 
that vision. This study is the first to examine empirically the move toward a cashless society 
using a cost-benefit framework. We find that when all key parties to a transaction are considered 
and benefits are added, cash and checks are more costly than many earlier studies suggest. In 
general, the shift toward a cashless society appears to be a beneficial one. 
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The Move Toward a Cashless Society: A Closer Look at Payment Instrument 
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Abstract 
Ever since the first general-purpose charge card debuted in the early 1950s, pundits have been 
predicting the “cashless society”. Over fifty years later, we may finally be getting close to that 
vision. This study is the first to examine empirically the move toward a cashless society using a 
cost-benefit framework. We find that when all key parties to a transaction are considered and 
benefits are added, cash and checks are more costly than many earlier studies suggest. In general, 
the shift toward a cashless society appears to be a beneficial one. 
1 Introduction   
Over the course of history, there have been many different forms of payment systems, 
including barter, gold, and paper currency. In the mid-twentieth century, charge cards 
debuted. Ever since then, pundits have been predicting the demise of cash and the 
emergence of a cashless society. Today, we still pay with cash and checks, but certain 
payment cards are growing at a much faster rate than paper instruments. In this paper, we 
analyze the costs and benefits of payment instruments involved in the shift toward a 
cashless society. 
As new payment systems have been introduced, researchers have critically examined 
their costs from both a private and social perspective. Scholars have studied why 
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authors would like to thank the AEI-Brookings Joint Center and Visa U.S.A. for financial support. This 
paper reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily those of their affiliated institutions. 
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individuals and firms use or accept various payment instruments. Some have also 
considered whether economic welfare would be improved if certain payment instruments 
displaced others, such as if electronic instruments displaced paper-based instruments. Our 
study is the first to empirically examine the move toward a cashless society using benefits 
as well as costs. 
A deeper understanding of the economics of payment instruments could have important 
implications for policy. For example, two recent regulatory cases examine whether 
payment cards are “overused” in a social welfare sense: the investigation of MasterCard by 
the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom and the Australian central bank 
investigation of MasterCard and Visa. In brief, the regulators claim that payment card 
systems charge “unjustifiably high” fees to merchants for payment cards while the banks 
issuing payment cards provide consumers with below-cost services and loyalty rewards.
1 
By not charging consumers the full marginal cost imposed by their card use, the regulators 
assert that payment card systems encourage consumers to overuse payment cards, which 
they can afford to do profitably because merchants shoulder the cost.  
In the United States, the scrutiny has been no less intense, but has emphasized different 
pricing aspects of the payment card systems. In the widely publicized Wal-Mart case, for 
example, the plaintiffs argued that debit cards were illegally tied to credit cards. Merchants 
accepting credit cards also had to accept debit cards. Plaintiffs claimed that this tie enabled 
the payment card systems to charge “exorbitant” fees to merchants, although they did not 
argue that the end result was debit card overuse.  
While all of these policy issues are worth examining, we would argue that most of the 
empirical studies addressing them have been incomplete because they do not adequately 
consider key parties in a transaction nor include economic benefits. The main objective of 
this paper is to illustrate the importance of careful cost-benefit analysis in addressing key 
policy questions involving payment instruments. The empirical applications we develop 
illustrate how cost-benefit analysis can provide policy makers with insights on how moves 
toward a cashless society affect net economic welfare. We find that retailer cost studies 
suggesting that payment cards are very costly are misleading when used to argue that 
payment cards are costly for the economy as a whole. When other parties to a transaction 
are considered and benefits are included, payment cards appear competitive with other 
forms of payment available to consumers. Our results suggest that the slow but inevitable 
shift toward a cashless society is beneficial, providing certain groups with clear benefits 
while not costing more to process in the aggregate than traditional paper transactions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly reviews the academic literature. A 
significant portion of this literature has focused solely on the costs of payment instruments, 
and thus provides little guidance on the net benefits of substituting one payment instrument 
for another. Section III presents a simple theoretical framework for assessing the costs and 
benefits of payment instruments. In Section IV, we present two empirical case studies.
2 To 
make the issue tractable, our case studies focus on two retail environments: grocery stores 
and electronics specialty stores. Section V presents our main conclusions.  
                                                 
1 Merchants pay a fee, referred to as the “merchant discount”, to the banks that process their payment card 
transactions. Merchants’ banks must then pass on a portion of that fee, referred to as the “interchange fee”, to 
cardholders’ banks. Thus, merchants indirectly pay card issuing banks for each payment card transaction. 
2 A companion paper, Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006b), includes the full details of these case studies, plus a third 
case study, on discount store transactions. 
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2  Literature review  
Several scholars have evaluated the costs of various payment instruments. Most ignore the 
benefits side of the equation altogether; others do an incomplete job of examining costs. A 
few look solely at benefits without considering costs.  
Humphrey and Berger (1990) present one of the earliest attempts to comprehensively 
estimate payment instrument costs. The authors calculate private and social costs for nine 
separate payment instruments. They find that, from a social cost perspective, cash is the 
cheapest payment instrument, followed by various electronic payment methods. From a 
private perspective, cash and checks emerge as the cheapest payment methods. Humphrey 
and Berger argue that because payers using credit cards and checks benefit from float, they 
tend to “overuse” these payment methods – a market failure that could be overcome with 
government intervention.
3 Humphrey and Berger’s analysis focuses exclusively on costs. 
Although they acknowledge that “convenience and acceptability” may play a role in 
payment instrument choice, in their calculations they omit the benefits that accrue from 
using different payment systems.  
Wells (1996) extends the Humphrey-Berger study. She argues that Humphrey and 
Berger underestimate the social cost of checks. She also observes that check use did not 
fall between 1987 and 1993, even though the value of float fell, calling into question the 
overuse hypothesis. Like Humphrey and Berger, Wells focuses on costs and acknowledges 
that benefits matter – particularly in her discussion of why checks are used more frequently 
than less costly alternatives – but does not attempt to measure any of these benefits. 
Humphrey et al. (1996) analyze patterns in the use of cash and other paper and 
electronic payment instruments in 14 developed countries, including the U.S, for 1987-
1993. They find that the calculated prices of payment instruments fail to explain 
differences in instrument use across countries and over time. They also find that 
“institutional variables” – in particular the violent crime rate – explain a non-trivial portion 
of the observed differences in usage across countries. Crime could be interpreted instead as 
an indirect cost. Unlike payment cards and checks, which bear the owner’s name and 
therefore require a degree of sophistication to use without authorization, stolen cash is 
perfectly transferable. The authors’ finding confirms the importance of considering 
probabilistic costs like the perceived risk of theft.  
Humphrey et al. (2003) is a more recent survey of the payment cost literature. The 
authors suggest that a country could save 1 percent of its GDP annually by shifting from a 
fully paper-based to a fully electronic-based system. Costs are presented at country-
specific/instrument-specific average transaction sizes, however, making cross-country and 
cross-instrument comparisons difficult. Some of the comparisons also omit certain parties 
to transactions, namely central banks and consumers, most likely due to missing data. 
Finally, because the literature does not quantify benefits, Humphrey et al.’s survey does 
not either. 
                                                 
3 This point does not necessarily follow, though, since payment card systems are two-sided markets. Payment 
card pricing and cost-sharing arrangements help to get both of the crucial parties to the transaction to 
participate. See Evans (2003) at pp. 357-358. For a theoretical treatment of two-sided market issues, see 
Rochet and Tirole (2003); and Parker and Van Alstyne (2000). Because the payment card system needs to 
balance overall demand, the prices charged to any one side will not generally equal the marginal cost on that 
side, if indeed marginal costs can even be separated by sides. See Schmalensee (2002).  
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A paper by Stavins (1997) is one of the first to include benefits as well as costs. Stavins 
examines the transition from traditional check clearing to electronic check “presentment 
and truncation”.
4 Stavins concludes that electronic check processing would raise net social 
benefits by a substantial amount (2.39 cents per check or $1.4 billion per year), although 
transition costs and other obstacles may stand in the way of easy adoption.  
A handful of other studies do not evaluate costs at all, but focus instead on benefits. 
Carow and Staten (1999) survey gas and store-cardholders on why they choose to pay with 
general-purpose payment cards. The authors find that the convenience of using a single 
payment card and the potential to earn rebates are among the primary reasons for using a 
bankcard. Mantel (2000) summarizes the literature on consumer payment decision-making, 
also focusing on payer benefits. He proposes a framework in which three factors explain 
the private use of electronic banking: consumer wealth; personal preferences, such as 
convenience and privacy; and transaction-specific factors, such as the transaction size. In 
similar work on electronic payment instrument decisions, MacKie-Mason and White 
(1996) show how a decision-maker may follow a systematic approach to selecting a 
payment mechanism. They conclude that only a handful of payment instrument 
characteristics likely play a dominant role in the selection process.  
The majority of the empirical academic studies focus either exclusively or mainly on 
the cost of payment instruments. This is likely due to the difficulty in defining and 
measuring the benefits that various payment instruments provide. Some studies hint that 
benefits such as convenience matter, but they do not develop the implications of this 
insight. Stavins (1997) is the only U.S. study, to our knowledge, that makes a systematic 
attempt to measure costs and benefits for all parties involved, but her study focuses 
exclusively on check processing. While cost considerations are necessary, they are not 
sufficient for making sound policy recommendations. The challenge is to systematically 
study the costs and benefits of various payment methods, taking as many costs and benefits 
as possible into account for all parties involved. 
3  Clarifying the cost-benefit approach  
Here we clarify the focus of our cost-benefit analysis. We could, for example, try to 
position ourselves in a world without payment cards, or electronic payment methods more 
generally, and pose the question: Would the introduction of these payment instruments be 
beneficial to society? 
Adopting this approach would be analogous to addressing the traditional issue of 
whether a bridge over a river should be constructed or not, when people are used to 
crossing the river by ferry (Layard and Glaister, 2001). If we were to closely follow this 
approach, the cost-benefit calculations would proceed in three steps. First, we would 
calculate the net cost of using the new alternative on a per-transaction basis and would 
compare it with the net cost of using the old method. (Note that in the case of payment 
instruments the calculations would be somewhat more complicated than in the case of the 
bridge, since payment methods are two-sided platforms.) Second, assuming that the per-
unit net benefit (that is benefits net of costs) of using the new alternative is higher than the 
                                                 
4 With electronic check truncation, the physical transfer of the original paper check to the paying bank is 
terminated. Instead, the check is electronically presented to the paying bank (and all the other processors in 
between) by sending an electronic image of the check. 
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per-unit net benefit of the old method, we would calculate the expected discounted flow of 
net benefits that would accrue to society over the relevant period of time. Potentially, there 
would be net benefits not only because the transactions that were already taking place 
would be conducted at a lower net social cost, but also because transactions that were not 
happening before would now take place. Finally, we would compare the sum of these 
discounted net benefits with the up-front cost of building the new alternative (the payment-
card system), and would determine whether it makes sense for society to introduce the new 
alternative or not. 
This approach is not available for a study of payment instruments today. For all 
practical purposes, the bridge has been constructed already – payment cards, and electronic 
payment instruments more generally, are pervasive. Furthermore, recovering information 
on how much it cost to build the system would be a monumental task at this stage. In 
addition to observing that the system is in place today, we also observe that payment cards, 
and electronic instruments more generally, have been replacing paper instruments for 
many years.  
Table 1 illustrates that payment card use (whether credit, charge or debit) has increased 
significantly over the last decade. This shift holds for every single transaction size.
5 In 
contrast, the use of paper instruments – cash and checks – has declined significantly for 




 Transaction  Size 
 $5-10  $10-20  $20-40  $40-60  $60-80  $80-100 $100-500  $500 +  Overall
Credit/Charge  5 5  11  6 6 5 2 3 5 
Debit  11 15 16 14 14 12 10  5  10 
Card  Total 16 19 27 20 20 17 13  8  15 
           
Cash  -10  -11  -8 -6 -5 -4 -2 1 -4 
Checks  -7  -11 -22 -19 -20 -18 -16 -10 -12 
Paper Total  -17 -22  -30 -25 -25 -22 -18  -9  -16
Table 1: The percentage point change in transaction shares by transaction size, 1996-
2004 
Notes: Debit includes both signature and PIN debit. Other instruments, including ACH and EFT, are 
excluded so the card and paper totals will not net to zero. Numbers may not add due to rounding.  
Source:  Visa U.S.A. (2005)  
In light of these events, we have chosen to address a different question: Is society 
better off when people conduct an additional transaction on payment cards rather than on 
paper instruments? The fact that consumers are choosing to pay more often with payment 
cards when they could continue to pay with checks or cash implies that they are better off. 
                                                 
5 As payment choices changes, economies of scale force other changes. For instance, the decline in check use 
has led the Fed to close check-processing stations in the recent past. Electronic payment methods, on the 
other hand, probably still benefit from increasing returns to scale as more merchants (such as fast food 
restaurants) accept card payments. 
6  The one exception is cash for $500+ transactions. 
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The question is whether economic welfare increases when the calculation includes other 
groups, such as merchants and banks. If consumers do not face the full price of using a 
payment card, a point made by several scholars (for example, Humphrey and Berger, 1990; 
Chakravorti, 2002; and Rochet and Tirole, 2002), then what is good for consumers might 
not be good for the economy as a whole.  
This approach requires that we examine the incremental transaction and pose the 
following question. What are the costs and benefits of this transaction, conducted using 
different payment instruments, for each one of the parties involved? In order to properly 
address this question, we need to consider three issues. First, we need to take all parties 
into account. Payment instruments that are beneficial, on net, for one of the actors may not 
be for society as a whole. Second, we need to carefully distinguish true resource costs from 
transfer payments. Third, we need to count both cost and benefits for all participants. 
The strengths of our exercise, in comparison with earlier cost accounting attempts, are 
twofold: we systematically consider all parties to a transaction, and we calculate the value 
of benefits and costs rather than costs only.  
Before presenting the calculations we briefly discuss the limitations of our approach. 
First, in our empirical analysis we are assuming that a given transaction will occur 
regardless of the payment method decision. This conditional approach examines costs and 
benefits of payment instruments under the assumption that a transaction will take place 
with certainty at a given size and in a specific context. An alternative unconditional 
approach, analogous to general equilibrium analysis, takes into account the possibility that 
the size and location of a transaction can vary, as can the overall level of transactions. For 
instance, the Internet frequently provides consumers with an alternative to shopping in a 
physical store. 
One benefit of using an unconditional approach is that it can capture the transaction 
cost savings inherent in changing how a purchase occurs. For example, when merchants 
expand the menu of payment instruments allowed, consumers can get closer to their 
preferred method of paying in their preferred retail venue. Eliminating the search for a 
store that accepts a preferred payment instrument lowers transaction costs. Reduced 
transaction costs then free resources for additional consumption or savings. 
In our empirical analysis we use a conditional approach. However, it is important to 
recognize that the assessment of the relative costs and benefits could change significantly 
with the application of an unconditional approach – just as in comparisons of net benefits 
using partial and general equilibrium analysis (Goulder and Williams, 2003).  
Second, even though we have tried to take heterogeneity into account, it is likely that 
we have not gone far enough. In the real world, the evidence suggests that, even for a 
given transaction size, many different payment instruments are used. Figure 1 shows the 
percentage of 2004 consumer-to-business transactions (by sales volume) paid for by 
payment cards and paper instruments, broken out by transaction size.  






































































Figure 1: Payment instrument transaction shares at various sizes for 2004 
Note:  Debit includes both signature and PIN debit. Charge cards are included with credit. 
The figure reveals that a wide mix of instruments is used for transactions at a given 
size. Even though cash is more widely used for small size transactions it is not the only 
instrument used. Various factors account for this payment instrument use at a given 
transaction size, and surely consumer and merchant heterogeneity are key among them. 
Consumers, for example, vary in income and wealth. Individuals with higher labor 
incomes may have a higher opportunity cost of time and may be willing to pay more for a 
transaction that is faster.
7 Merchants are heterogeneous as well. For example, a discount 
retailer with multiple checkout lanes will face different costs and benefits when accepting 
personal checks or PIN debit cards than a boutique retailer with only one payment 
register.
8  
 Source:   Visa U.S.A. (2005)  
In our empirical analysis we try to account for two types of heterogeneity. First, we 
consider various transaction sizes, thus acknowledging the possibility that costs and 
benefits may vary depending on transaction amount. Second, we consider transactions at 
different types of merchants. In other words, we take into account merchant heterogeneity 
to the extent that the data allow us to. As far as consumers are concerned, the data limit us 
to analyzing a representative consumer.
9
The existence of heterogeneous consumers and merchants raises a third issue for 
interpreting the cost and benefit numbers. Throughout our study we use the terms 
“marginal costs” and “marginal benefits.” Strictly speaking, we are calculating per-
transaction incremental costs and benefits for a typical consumer or merchant of a 
                                                 
7 Heterogeneity may exist not only across consumers, but also across transactions for a given consumer. 
8 Most debit cards can be used for either PIN or signature debit – the transaction distinction is made at the 
processing level. If a debit card receipt is signed for authorization it is referred to as signature debit and is 
processed at the point of sale using standard credit and charge card readers. When a debit card receipt is 
authorized with a personal identification number (PIN debit), a special PIN reader must be used. 
9 We explore the sensitivity of our results for key parameters, such as the value of time, in Garcia-Swartz et 
al. (2006b). Our qualitative results are generally robust to changes in the key parameters. 
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particular type.
10 If data were available, we would prefer to estimate marginal benefits and 
costs for a set of heterogeneous consumers and merchants involved in different types of 
transactions. Because of data limitations, we rely on sensitivity analysis to explore the 
robustness of our main conclusions.
11
4  Empirical estimates  
To demonstrate the importance of moving beyond costs, we develop three case studies that 
start with earlier cost analyses, but are expanded to cover multiple parties and to include 
benefits. We focus our analysis on the tendency of consumers to make greater use of 
payment cards over time. Because the location of a transaction influences the cost and 
benefit calculations, we analyze social net benefits in two specific retail venues: grocery 
stores and electronics specialty stores. These venues cover a range of goods and average 
prices. As one might expect, payment instrument use varies over time and by venue. For 
example, the share of cash and check use has declined dramatically at grocery stores, from 
nearly 90 percent in 1994 to under 60 percent by 2001. In place of paper instruments, the 
share of payment card use has increased – especially debit cards, which accounted for 
around 20 percent of grocery store volume by 2001. A different picture emerges at 
electronics specialty stores: cash was never an important payment instrument (accounting 
for less than 10 percent of purchases) while credit is by far the most frequently used 
method (hovering near 60 percent throughout the 1990s). Transaction size likely plays a 
large role here – the average electronics purchase is several times higher than the average 
grocery purchase. 
We begin our analysis with merchant cost estimates sponsored by industry participants 
and used in previous academic studies. Then we fix transaction size, broaden the analysis 
to include all parties to a transaction, and quantify benefits where possible. We highlight 
the dramatic changes that these modifications bring: those instruments that appear 
expensive to merchants are often relatively inexpensive for the economy as a whole.  
The following equations, based on an extension of the model developed by Baxter 
(1983), define the case study exercise below. Let C denote resource costs and B denote 
benefits for a payment card transaction relative to cash. The sub- and superscripts m, c, b, 
                                                 
10 Some of our data sources allow only for average figures, such as commercial bank processing costs. We 
exclude costs that do not vary per transaction, such as the marketing expenditures made by commercial 
banks for checking accounts, credit cards, and debit cards. 
11 Furthermore, note that, even though we try to take certain externalities into account (for example, the 
negative externality imposed by someone paying at the counter on someone else waiting in line), our 
calculations do not incorporate the Rochet-Tirole “main externalities” of cardholders on merchants and of 
merchants on cardholders. First, a merchant that does not accept a payment card generates a negative 
externality for cardholders.  Second, cardholders may not internalize the merchants’ welfare. In the Rochet-
Tirole framework, the merchants’ acceptance decision depends on the average net benefit that cardholders 
enjoy. By definition, the average cardholder net benefit from using the card is higher than the marginal net 
benefit, which is zero. As a consequence, in this framework the merchants’ opposition to cards may be too 
weak, and certain card transactions may happen that should not have happened from the perspective of social 
efficiency. (They should not have happened because the net benefit that the cardholder obtains from them is 
smaller than the loss that the merchant experiences.) As Rochet and Tirole put it: “That is, the cardholder’s 
lack of internalization of the merchant’s loss (which itself is based on the merchant’s internalization of 
cardholders’ welfare!) may lead to inefficient card transactions” (Rochet and Tirole, 2006).    
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and g denote merchants, consumers, commercial banks, and the government, respectively. 




g = +  as the explicit price that consumers face when making a 
transaction with a payment card relative to cash, where   is the price they pay to 




g P is the price they pay to the government, both prices relative to 
cash. Then, consumers are better off using cards if and only if  
(1) 
c ccc
bg B CPP >++ 
In other words, consumers are better off if the (private) benefits they obtain from a card 
transaction (relative to cash) are larger than their (private) resource costs of conducting a 
card transaction relative to cash plus the relative explicit price they pay for the card 
transaction. Consumers will choose to pay with cards only when equation (1) holds. 
Similarly, merchants weigh the benefits of cards relative to cash against the relative 





m B CP ≥+ 




bb B PPC = +≥ 
The analogous equation for the government is:  
  
(4)   
cg
g PC ≥
Taking these four private comparisons and netting out transfers between the parties 
yields the following social equation: 
(5) 
cmcmbg B BC CC C + ≥+++ 
If condition (5) is met, then society is better off when a payment card transaction 
replaces a cash one. In the tables below, we present estimates for the costs and benefits 
facing these four parties to a transaction. 
Calculations like the ones presented below can convey a false sense of precision. In 
order to highlight the often small differences in costs and benefits across payment 
instruments, we report figures to the nearest cent. Most of these numbers are estimates. 
While the analysis represents careful accounting, all numbers should be interpreted as 
suggestive but not definitive.  
4.1  Replacing cash and checks at the grocery counter 
The first case study examines whether the shift toward increased payment card use in 
grocery stores has resulted in economic welfare gains.
12 We begin with the Food 
Marketing Institute (1998) cost study, which surveyed grocers on the marginal costs of 
accepting various payment instruments. Costs vary considerably among grocery stores as a 
function of size, geographic location, age and sophistication of the equipment used. FMI 
                                                 
12 For details on the calculations made in the case studies that follow, as well as for data sources and 
sensitivity analysis, see the companion paper Garcia-Swartz et al. (2006b).  
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therefore reported high, low, and average costs based on its survey; we use average costs 
here. 
Table 2 presents merchant processing costs for grocery stores. A couple of items 
should be highlighted. First, following standard practice (for now), the per-transaction 
costs in each cell of Section A are calculated for a different transaction size: the average 
size for the given payment instrument. Certain costs, such as some bank charges, are 
sensitive to the purchase amount, so costs presented this way are difficult to compare. 
Second, the relative costs of the various payment instruments change considerably when 
the costs are translated to $100 of sales (see Section B). This method of scaling – another 
industry study standard – multiplies the costs per average transaction by the constant 
necessary to reach $100 of sales, thus assuming all costs vary linearly.  











Debit  PIN Debit 
Theft/Counterfeit   0.03  0 0 0 0 
Table 2: Per transaction processing costs for various payment instruments grocery 
store merchants ($) 
Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Float costs are calculated as interest foregone from the date of 
sale to the payment – method-specific date of clearance. Tender time is the labor cost from the time 
the total amount is displayed on the cash register to the time payment is consummated. Deposit 
preparation measures the labor costs of preparing a typical bank deposit for a merchant’s bank 
account. Electronic payment methods are cleared online at the point of sale and therefore do not 
involve any deposit preparation. Bank charges are explicit fees, such as a deposit fee for cash and 
checks or processing fees for payment cards. This includes the “merchant discount” fee assessed by 
commercial banks for payment card transactions. Other direct costs capture miscellaneous costs 
associated with each type of payment, such as check losses and collection fees, credit card losses 
(including “charge backs”), and armored car costs for transporting cash to the bank.  
*Non-verified checks are manually authorized at the checkout counter. Verified checks are electronically 
authorized to have sufficient funds in the account to cover the purchase. 
 Source: FMI (1998) survey and authors’ calculations.  
0 
Float  0.001  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.003 
Tender  Time  0.11 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.17 
Deposit Preparation  0.004  0.03  0.03  0  0  0 
Bank  Charges  0.004  0.06 0.16 0.94 0.56 
Section A 
 
Other Direct Costs  0.16  0.27  0.03  0.02  0 
0.41 
0 
  Marginal  Costs 0.30 0.64 0.47 1.15 0.75 0.57 
          
Average Purchase 
for Payment Type  11.52  54.24  54.24  44.50  33.00  41.05 
Section B 
 
Cost Scaled to $100 
of  Sales  2.61 1.17 0.86 2.58 2.27 1.40 
          
Marginal Costs, 
Cash Transaction  




Size  $54.24  0.43 0.64 0.47 1.22 0.82 0.57 
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Linear scaling of costs is misleading because some costs do not vary at all with 
transaction size while others vary in a non-linear way. We therefore calculate costs for two 
fixed transaction sizes in Section C of Table 2.
13 Using a fixed transaction size induces a 
dramatic change in terms of relative payment instrument costs. Taking the typical cash 
transaction size, the marginal cost of credit and signature debit cards fall considerably as 
compared to the marginal cost reported in Section A. For the typical check transaction size, 
however, credit cards are around twice as expensive for merchants as checks. Cash remains 
the cheapest method for grocery store merchants at each transaction size. 
The costs reported in Table 2 say nothing about whether economic benefits result when 
payment cards replace cash and checks for grocery purchases. Two adjustments are needed 
to analyze the welfare changes that shifts in payment methods can generate. First, we need 
to consider other parties involved in the transaction. Second, we need to calculate the 
benefits accruing to the parties involved.  
4.1.1  Adding other parties to the transaction 
Table 3 adds the cost of using a payment instrument for consumers and the cost of 
processing the payment for the Federal Reserve and commercial banks. The first number in 
each cell bases the calculation on the grocery average cash transaction size of $11.52 and 
the second number bases it on the average check size of $54.24.  
The first group added is consumers. Consumers making a purchase face an opportunity 
cost for the time spent at the register while a transaction is processed (“Processing 
Time”).
14 In addition, consumers waiting in line face an opportunity cost for their time 
while the current payer’s transaction is being conducted, captured by “Queue Time”. We 
measure these costs as the average U.S. wage rate multiplied by the payment processing 
time.
15 In-network ATM fees for cash withdrawal (own bank) are the explicit cost to 
consumers of getting cash, scaled by the percentage of consumers facing such fees. To the 
extent that consumers access off-network ATMs, we are understating the explicit price for 
cash paid by consumers. The explicit cost of checks is the purchase price of a paper check.  
As the last cost item for consumers, we add the implicit cost of obtaining cash. This 
cost consists of the typical amount of time that consumers spend in making a trip to an 
ATM multiplied by the average U.S. wage rate.
16 Note that the implicit cost of cash 
increases dramatically with transaction size. The average cash withdrawal is $60, which 
translates into six small transactions of $10, but only one transaction of $50, with the full 
time cost applied to that one purchase. Of course, knowing that they have to make a larger 
purchase, consumers could increase their withdrawal amount, up to a maximum of $200 or 
$300 usually. However, as the amount of cash carried increases, so too does the risk of loss 
or theft. We also know from Figure 1 that less than 20 percent of the $40-60 transactions 
                                                 
13 The fact that the average transaction size for cash differs from that for checks (and payments cards, as 
well) indicates that consumer preferences for payment mechanisms vary by transaction size. Whitesell 
(1989) develops a model that explains some of the preference differences. See also, Santomero and Seater 
(1996). 
14 Klee (2004) finds that debit card use in grocery store transactions increases with the difference in 
processing time as compared to checks.  
15 Because this measure may either under or overstate the true opportunity cost of time, we test the sensitivity 
of our results to changes in the wage rate. 
16 For consumers using point of sale cash-back (primarily with PIN debit) or other faster means of obtaining 
cash, this estimate could be an overstatement. For other consumers, obtaining cash may take more time and 
the estimate could be an understatement. When consumers drive to an ATM, they incur a driving cost in 
addition to time. We do not include this cost, which will also understate our estimate. 
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are paid for with cash, at least partly due to the increased costs of carrying large amounts 
of cash. Taking all of these factors into account, we choose a moderate option of doubling 
the cash withdrawal amount to $120, allowing for over two transactions per ATM trip, as 
the basis of our implicit cost calculation for the larger transaction size.
17
The central bank is the second party added to the calculations. The Federal Reserve 
incurs production costs for cash, which we translate into a per-dollar cost. It also incurs 
handling costs for cash. Unlike metal coins, cash has a short lifespan. With each 
transaction, a bill becomes more soiled and worn. The central bank maintains the quality of 
paper currency, removing any unfit bills. The Federal Reserve provides this service, 
subsidizing the use of cash by coordinating supplies for banks and maintaining a high level 
of currency quality, without charge to consumers or commercial banks (Lacker, 1993).
18 
We therefore include the central bank’s per-transaction cost of processing and replacing 
cash as a marginal cost. Federal Reserve Banks also act as intermediaries in check 
processing for commercial banks, passing these costs on in full to the banks.  
Commercial Banks are the third and final party added to the calculations. ATM 
machines must be maintained and refilled with cash periodically. We allocate monthly 
maintenance costs across the number of potential transactions generated by monthly 
withdrawals to estimate the per-transaction ATM cost. Just as with paper currency, the 
magnetic stripe on plastic payment cards wears out over time and must be replaced, 
typically every two years. For commercial bank check processing costs, we report per-
transaction in-house costs plus processing fees paid to intermediaries such as the Federal 
Reserve. Commercial banks also incur processing costs for payment cards. For example, 
card issuers fund consumer credit card float for an average of 25 days, paying merchants 
within a day or so but receiving cardholder payment nearly a month after the purchase 
date.
19 Acquirers expend resources to facilitate transaction clearing between card issuers 
and merchants. Finally, commercial banks must fund the payment card reward programs 
they offer consumers.  
                                                 
17 The implicit cost of obtaining cash if the $60 average withdrawal is maintained for the larger purchase size 
is $1.30. If the maximum allowable cash extraction of $300 is used, the implicit cost of obtaining cash for the 
$54 purchase is 26 cents. Our assumption of a $120 withdrawal is unavoidably arbitrary.  
18 The question of subsidization has been raised for several different payment instruments. Humphrey and 
Berger (1990) assert that consumer check and credit card use are both subsidized (by commercial banks in 
the case of checks and indirectly by merchants in the case of credit cards). It appears that commercial banks 
subsidize PIN debit use as well. The ATM networks operating PIN debit designed the price structure with 
relatively low interchange fees as compared to signature debit and credit cards in part to provide merchants 
with an incentive to lease and install special PIN pad equipment. Signature debit transactions, on the other 
hand, are processed using credit card equipment already in place at most merchants. Today, however, after 
many merchants have already installed PIN pad equipment, debit-processing banks appear concerned they 
are not covering costs with PIN interchange fees.  
19 The cost of funds for float only applies to those credit card customers current with their bills. Customers 
with outstanding credit pay interest on purchases immediately. 











Debit  PIN Debit 
a) Merchant Marginal 
     Costs (Table 2)  .30, .43  .42, .64  .44, .47  .61, 1.22  .68, .82  .57, .57 
Consumer 
     Processing Time  .14, .14  .33, .33  .31, .31  .23, .23  .23, .23  .21, .21 
     Queue Time  .14, .14  .33, .33  .31, .31  .23, .23  .23, .23  .21, .21 
     Explicit Price  .03, .03  .04, .04  .04, .04  0, 0  0, 0  .13, .13 
     Implicit Price  .28, 0.65  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
     Seigniorage  .07, .33  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
b) Consumer Marginal 
     Costs  .65, 1.27  .70, .70  .65, .65  .46, .46  .46, .46  .55, .55 
Central Bank 
      Production  .001, .01  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
      Processing  .002, .002  .03, .03  .03, .03  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
c) Central Bank Marginal 
     Costs  .004, .01  .03, .03  .03, .03  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Commercial Bank  
     ATM Maintenance  .06, .30  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
     Production  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .01, .01  .01, .01  .01, .01 
     Processing  .004, .02  .12, .12  .12, .12  .27, .40  .26, .34  .26, .34 
     Reward Cards   0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .05, .24  0, 0  0, 0 
d) Commercial Bank 
     Marginal Costs  .07, .31  .12, .12  .12, .12  .34, .65  .27, .35  .27, .35 
e) Sum of Marginal Costs  1.02, 2.02  1.27, 1.49  1.24, 1.27  1.41, 2.33  1.42, 1.63  1.40, 1.48 
f) Social Marginal Costs  .99, 1.98  1.18, 1.40  1.05, 1.08  0.99, 1.32  .92, 1.00  .86, .94 
Table 3: Private and social marginal costs grocery cash ($11.52) and check ($54.24) 
transaction sizes ($) 
Notes:  The first and second numbers in each cell correspond to the lower and higher transaction sizes, 
respectively. Numbers may not add due to rounding. Sum of Marginal Costs, e, is equal to a + b + c 
+ d. Due to transfers across parties (such as merchant payments to commercial banks), the sum 
double counts some cost elements. Social Marginal Costs, f, eliminates transfers to avoid double 
counting. 
Source: Authors’  calculations.  
At the cash transaction size, the costs in Table 3 for all payment types are relatively 
close to one another. In Table 2, the spread between the most and least expensive 
instruments was nearly 87 cents; in Table 3 that spread is only around 41 cents. Moreover, 
cash – the cheapest instrument for merchants – is not the cheapest instrument for the 
economy as a whole, at either the smaller or the larger transaction size. Counting all 
parties, PIN debit transactions are cheapest, followed closely by signature debit. For the 
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smaller transaction, cash is third and credit is fourth. But for the larger transaction, paper 
instruments, especially cash and non-verified checks, emerge as more costly forms of 
payment. Thus adding other parties to the transaction has changed the relative cost 
situation considerably.  
4.1.2 Quantifying  benefits 
We now turn to our next key adjustment: quantifying the benefits of payment instruments. 












Debit  PIN Debit 
Consumers 
     Float  0, 0  .002, .01  .002, .01  .01, .04  0, 0  0, 0 
     Credit Option  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .03, .02  0, 0  0, 0 
     Record Keeping  0, 0  .04, .04  .04, .04  .04, .04  .04, .04  .04, .04 
     Cash Back Option  0, 0  .15, .15  .15, .15  0, 0  0, 0  .13, .13 
     Signature Debit   0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .13, .13  0, 0 
     Reward Cards  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .10, .48  0, 0  0, 0 
     Discover Cards  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .003, .02  0, 0  0, 0 
     Privacy  .12, .54  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Consumer Marginal Benefits  .12, .54  .19, .19  .19, .19  .18, .60  .16, .16  .16, .16 
Central Bank  
     Processing Revenue  .002, .002  .03, .03  .03, .03  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
     Seigniorage  .07, .33  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Central Bank Marginal 
      Benefits  .07, .33  .03, .03  .03, .03  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Commercial Bank 
     Float  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .002, .01  .001, .004 
     Processing Revenue  .03, .05  .06, .06  .16, .16  .42, 1.01  .50, .63  .54, .54 
Commercial Bank Marginal 
     Benefits  .03, .05  .06, .06  .16, .16  .42, 1.01  .50, .64  .54, .54 
Sum of Marginal Benefits  .22, .92  .28, .28  .38, .38  .62, 1.62  0.66, 0.80  .57, .57 
        
Sum of Marginal Costs 
     (Table 3)  1.02, 2.02  1.27, 1.49  1.24, 1.27  1.42, 2.33  1.42, 1.63  1.40, 1.48 
Net Social Marginal Costs   .80, 1.11  .99, 1.21  .87, .89  .80, .72  .76, .83  .70, .78 
Table 4: Adding selected benefits grocery cash ($11.52) and check ($54.24) 
transactions ($) 
Notes:    The first and second numbers in each cell correspond to the lower and higher transaction sizes, 
respectively. Numbers may not add due to rounding. Net Social Marginal Costs equal the Sum of 
Marginal Costs minus the Sum of Marginal Benefits, which eliminates transfers across the parties 
(such as merchant payments to commercial banks for check processing). 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations.  
Table 4 adds estimates of per-transaction benefits associated with each of the payment instruments 
at the cash and check transaction sizes. Checks and credit cards provide consumers with 
some level of float, calculated as the interest that could be earned before the transaction 
clears. Credit cards provide consumers with the greatest amount of float, assuming the 
consumer is current with his or her bills. On average, consumers with no outstanding credit 
have 25 days from the date of purchase to the date their credit card bill is due.  
Credit cards also provide consumers with the option to borrow.
20 Uncertainty over 
income or expenses can lead a consumer to rely on credit cards for payment, even if she 
intends at the time of purchase to pay the charge in full when her bill arrives. This benefit 
is difficult to measure because it varies with personal finances and available credit options. 
For instance, consumers who own their home and have accumulated some equity may 
qualify for a home equity loan through their bank. Home equity lines are a relatively low-
cost credit option, but involve initial transaction costs and are unavailable to renters. In 
fact, all types of secured loans are generally unavailable to many consumers. Credit cards, 
on the other hand, offer a convenient source of unsecured credit to a broad cross section of 
consumers (Castronova and Hagstrom, 2004; and Nocera, 1994). Another unsecured credit 
alternative is the payday loan, but this is far more costly than credit card debt.
21 An 
alternative relatively similar to credit cards is a personal line of unsecured bank credit. 
These credit lines typically have a minimum amount of several thousand dollars, but the 
interest rate terms are similar to credit cards. Once an unsecured line of credit is 
established, consumers must pay an annual fee to maintain it. This fee can be thought of as 
the option price of borrowing over the year. We allocate the fee across the minimum loan 
to obtain an estimate of the per-dollar option value benefit, scaled by the percentage of 
cardholders exercising the option.
22
All payment methods except for cash provide consumers with a record keeping 
mechanism useful for budgeting, planning, and income tax preparation. Rather than having 
to keep track of each paper receipt, checks and payment cards provide itemized monthly 
statements; many also have online statements accessible anytime. We value this benefit 
using consumer survey data for analogous benefits. 
Using checks and debit cards for grocery purchases can save consumers time outside of 
the checkout lane. Grocers commonly offer a cash-back option that is free of charge for 
these two payment instruments. As a result, consumers can reduce their need to make a 
                                                 
20 Here we consider only the option value of obtaining credit, not the benefit of the credit itself net of the cost 
of funds. See Brito and Hartley (1995), at p. 402, who observe that credit cards “[provide] insurance against 
unanticipated shocks to expenditure or income”.  
21 A typical payday loan charges $17.50 on every $100 increment borrowed for each 15-day period. Thus a 
person borrowing $200 for one month would pay $70 in fees, which translates into an APR of 457 percent.  
22 As with the cash-back option for PIN debit cards, we scale this amount by the proportion of credit card 
users actually taking credit, which is around 55% of all cardholders. The option of using credit is likely to 
have value at the time of purchase, even if the bill is paid in full when due. Nonetheless, unlike stock 
options, both the credit option and the cash-back option for PIN do not require any upfront purchase. There 
is therefore no signal of value when the option is not exercised.  
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separate trip to an ATM to obtain cash for other purchases. We assume this benefit is equal 
to the implicit cost of obtaining cash from an ATM, scaled by the average cash-back 
amount and the percentage of debit transactions involving cash back. Signature debit cards 
offer benefits of their own, including card use similar to credit cards and broad merchant 
acceptance.  
Around 43 percent of credit cardholders have cards that provide rewards of some kind, 
counting American Express, MasterCard, and Visa reward cards. Moreover Discover’s 
cards offer “cash back”. The most prevalent type of reward card grants consumers airline 
miles, typically with each dollar spent earning the cardholder one frequent flyer mile. We 
estimate the value of a ticket earned and then scale that value by the proportion of a ticket 
a grocery store transaction earns. Around 6 percent of all cardholders have a Discover card 
that operates under a point system, providing either cash back or coupons according to a 
fixed schedule. We calculate the cash back amount based on that schedule and the average 
Discover monthly card balance. 
The last item listed for consumers is privacy. Some consumers worry that their 
purchases will be tracked if they pay with a check or plastic card that displays personal 
information. Cash provides consumers an anonymous method of paying. We estimate the 
privacy benefit that cash provides using loyalty card discounts. In supermarkets and many 
other stores, shunning a loyalty card means forgoing product discounts, which can be 
viewed as the implicit benefit of providing personal information. Consumers paying with 
cash (and not providing a loyalty card) must value their privacy at least as much as the 
discount forgone.  
Governments earn a profit on the currency they produce. Seigniorage can be defined in 
many ways, but the definition we follow as it most closely matches our concept of benefits 
is fiscal seigniorage – the profit from printing currency net of expenses that the 
government actually has available for budgeting purposes (Neumann, 1992). That is, fiscal 
seigniorage is the difference between what it costs the government to produce currency and 
the face value of the currency which is then at the government’s disposal. This “benefit” is 
analogous to the revenues collected by commercial banks: it represents a transfer (a tax) 
from cash-holding consumers to the Federal Reserve. As such, it is netted out in the social 
cost calculation. In addition, the Federal Reserve receives revenue from commercial banks 
to cover the cost of check processing.  
Finally, commercial banks earn revenues for processing cash deposits, processing and 
clearing checks, and processing payment card transactions. They also benefit from float for 
debit cards: funds are typically withdrawn from consumers’ accounts immediately, but 
payments to merchants take one to two days to finalize. 
Taking all of the above benefits into account, the position of payment cards relative to 
cash and checks generally improves, as Table 4 illustrates, at least for the larger transaction 
size. For the cash transaction size PIN debit cards are the least expensive instrument; for 
the check transaction size credit cards are least expensive. Non-verified checks are one of 
the most expensive instruments, but are joined by cash at the higher transaction size. All of 
the payment instruments are remarkably close to one another at the smaller transaction 
size. And in fact, for the smaller transaction size the rank ordering of instruments is 
identical to that based on costs alone given in Table 3. At the larger transaction size, 
however, the rank ordering changes considerably, with the three payment cards ranking as 
cheaper than either of the two paper instruments. Thus, industry studies of merchants’ 
costs do indeed present a misleading picture for policy makers. First, looking at individual 
  190Review of Network Economics     Vol.5, Issue 2 – June 2006 
 
average transaction sizes for each instrument masks some of the relative differences 
between payment types. Second, and more importantly, the ordering of payment 
instrument costs shifts significantly for larger transactions after multiple parties are added 
and benefits included.  
Note that these calculations disregard the value of many other benefits that are difficult 
to quantify. For instance, payment cards offer the option of consolidating payments – 
consumers charge everything on one card and pay only one bill at the end of the month. 
Many consumers value the enforced fiscal responsibility that cash, checks, and debit cards 
provide (Thaler, 1981; Stavins, 2001). Because these methods typically do not allow 
credit, they can help consumers to limit their debt. Checks and payment cards also provide 
improved theft and loss prevention as compared to cash, as well as easier dispute 
resolution in the event of problems. Credit and signature debit cards provide added 
protection because the card systems take an active role in dispute resolution. PIN debit 
does not provide this benefit as the money is immediately withdrawn from the consumer’s 
bank account and any dispute resolution is left to the consumer and the merchant, just as 
with a cash purchase. For merchants, the ability to reverse charges on payment cards for 
returned goods, as opposed to providing cash refunds, could be a benefit as well. All of 
these benefits are important and help to explain the pattern of observed payment 
instrument use. The difficult nature of estimating their value implies that we cannot 
account for them in Table 4.  
4.2  The rise of debit cards at electronics specialty stores  
In our second case study, we consider electronics specialty stores. We start with another 
merchant cost study, this one conducted by Coopers & Lybrand (1995). The Coopers study 
relied on cost data for one “representative” merchant for each segment considered. The 
cost estimates presented in this case study illustrate the effect that retail venue can have on 
payment instrument cost and benefit analysis. First, average transaction sizes are far higher 
in electronics specialty stores, as Table 5 illustrates. Second, the point of sale structure can 
be quite different. Many electronics stores do not have multiple checkout lanes positioned 
near the store exit. Moreover, even the large chains have been reluctant to accept PIN debit 
as the transactions require separate card readers. Thus, we would expect electronics store 
payment processing costs to be very different from grocery store costs.  
The methods used to calculate non-merchant costs are identical to the grocery case. We 
therefore present only the merchant cost table and the net marginal social cost table, which 
covers all parties to the transaction and incorporates benefits.  
Many cost elements are dramatically different than those for grocery store merchants, 
some higher and some lower. POS time costs are well below those for grocery stores – for 
example, the time cost for checks is lower by a factor of eight. Drawer/office costs are 
considerably higher for cash, but nearly identical for checks. Due to back office marginal 
costs, payment cards have non-zero drawer costs here. Bank charges are significantly 
higher as well, largely driven by the high average transaction sizes. Grocers reported an 
average cash purchase of around $11.50, but cash purchases at electronics stores are six 
times as high. Unlike grocery stores where checks were used for the largest average 
transactions, credit and charge cards have the highest averages here at roughly $150. Cash 
is the only payment instrument with an overall merchant cost similar to grocery stores. 
Checks are around three times as costly for electronics stores; signature debit cards are 
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over twice as costly. That said, cash is still the cheapest instrument for electronics stores to 
accept and checks are second. 
 
  
Cash Check  MC/Visa 




POS Time  0.06  0.15  0.12  0.11 0.11 0.12 
Drawer/Office 0.05  0.03  0.06  0.06 0.06 0.06 
Bank Charges  0.05  1.38  2.94  1.71 3.44 1.86 
Losses 0.08  0.07  0.03  0.04 0.04 0.03 
Float 0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 0.02 0.01 
Section A 
Other Direct Costs  0.07  0.02  0  0 0 0 
  Per Transaction Total Cost  0.32  1.67  3.16  1.95  3.67  2.08 
          
Average Receipt for Payment 
Type  64.98  124.66 150.39 149.87 148.15 99.3 
Section B 
Cost Scaled to $100 of Sales  0.49  1.34  2.10  1.30  2.48  2.09 
          
Cost, Cash Transaction Size 
$64.98  0.32 1.63 1.47 0.94 1.71 1.52 
Section C 
Cost, Check Transaction Size 
$124.66  0.39 1.67 2.65 1.65 3.12 2.47 
Table 5: Per transaction processing costs for various payment instruments electronics 
specialty store merchants ($) 
Notes: Charge and credit cards are combined for American Express. Store cards and other cards (such as 
Diners Club charge and credit) are omitted here. Numbers may not add due to rounding.  
Source:  Coopers & Lybrand (1995) and authors’ calculations.   
Table 6 presents social costs (that is, for merchants plus the other three parties) and 
adds benefits to the calculations.  
Electronics specialty stores likely enjoy a benefit that is not applicable to the other case 
studies. Before general-purpose credit cards, merchants selling relatively high-priced items 
often provided in-store installment credit plans. Appliances in particular were often bought 
on a time plan (Olney, 1999; and Caldor, 1999). By accepting credit cards, electronics 
specialty stores do not have to shoulder the expense of providing in-store credit. We do not 
include the marginal elements of this benefit (cost savings) in our calculations, as we do 
not have a reasonable means of estimating it. If included, it would lower the cost of credit 
cards relative to cash. 
Despite the differences in many of the individual cost and benefit elements, Table 6 
presents a relative ranking based on net social marginal costs that is fairly similar to the 
other case study. Cash is again among the most costly payment method for society, at 
either transaction size. One surprising result is the relative standing of checks. Unlike 
grocery store transactions, here checks emerge as cheaper than cash and debit cards. The 
result is driven by the high bank charge assessed merchants for checks as compared to the 
processing cost, charges that are netted out in the net social marginal cost calculations. It is 
unlikely that commercial banks are truly profiting more from checks used at electronics 
stores. Rather, it is likely that banks charge a higher fee to electronics stores because the 
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higher purchase amounts imply greater fraud and non-sufficient fund risks for banks, the 
costs of which are not captured in our average processing cost estimates.  
 
 
Cash Check  MC/Visa 





     Float  0, 0  .01, .02  .05, .10  .05, .10  .05, .10  0, 0 
     Credit Option  0, 0  0, 0  .18, .34  .18, .34  .18, .34  0, 0 
     Record Keeping  0, 0  .04, .04  .04, .04  .04, .04  .04, .04  .04, .04 
     Cash Back option  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
     Signature Debit  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .13, .13 
     Reward Cards  0, 0  0, 0  .62, 1.18  .33, .62  .62, 1.18  0, 0 
     Privacy  .65, 1.25  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Consumer Marginal Benefits  .65, 1.25  .04, .05  .88, 1.66  .59, 1.10  .88, 1.66  .17, .18 
Central Bank 
     Processing Revenue  .002, .002  .03, .03  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
     Seigniorage  .39, .75  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Central Bank Marginal Benefits  .39, .75  .03, .30  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Commercial Banks 
     Float  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  .01, .02 
     Processing Revenue  .08, .08  1.38, 1.38  1.27, 2.43  .74, 1.43  1.51, 2.89  1.31, 2.26 
Commercial Bank Marginal 
     Benefit  .08, .08  1.38, 1.38  1.27, 2.43  .74, 1.43  1.51, 2.89  1.32, 2.28 
Sum of Marginal Benefits  1.12, 2.08  1.45, 1.46  2.15, 4.09  1.33, 2.53  2.39, 4.55  1.48, 2.44 
        
Social Marginal Costs  2.10, 2.99  .67, .71  1.44, 1.91  1.49, 1.99  1.44, 1.91  1.09, 1.22 
Sum of Marginal Costs   2.18, 3.07  2.07, 2.12  2.73, 4.34  2.25, 3.43  2.97, 4.81  2.40, 3.48 
Net Social Marginal Costs   1.06, .99  .62, .66  .56, .25  .90, .90  .56, .26  .92, 1.04 
Table 6: Adding selected benefits, electronics specialty store cash ($64.98) and check 
($124.66) transactions ($) 
Notes:  The first and second numbers in each cell correspond to the lower and higher transaction sizes, 
respectively. Numbers may not add due to rounding. Net Social Marginal Cost equals the Sum of 
Marginal Costs minus the Sum of Marginal Benefits, which eliminates transfers across the parties 
(such as merchant payments to commercial banks for check processing). Social Marginal Costs are 
included for reference. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  
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5 Distributional  effects 
The overall social welfare question is the focus of our analysis in this paper – whether the 
data support the proposition that one additional electronic payment transaction costs 
society more than one additional paper payment transaction. As the tables and discussions 
above indicate, we do not find any evidence that electronic payment methods cost society 
more.  
Our data let us examine a related question as well – whether one additional electronic 
payment transaction affects the different parties in different ways. Table 7 below reorders 
the data from the first case study to address that question. Parties bearing relatively more 
of the costs for a given instrument are likely to push for regulatory changes – as was the 
case in the Australian Reserve Bank investigation of payment card systems, where retailer 







Check  Credit  Signature 
Debit  PIN Debit 
Merchant Marginal Costs  .30, .43  .41, .63  .44, .47  .61, 1.22  .68, .82  .57, .57 
Merchant Marginal Benefits  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
     Net Merchant MC  .30, .43  .41, .63  .44, .47  .61, 1.22  .68, .82  .57, .57 
Consumer Marginal Costs  .65, 1.27  .70, .70  .65, .65  .46, .46  .46, .46  .55, .55 
Consumer Marginal Benefits  .12, .54  .19, .19  .19, .19  .18, .60  .16, .16  .16, .16 
     Net Consumer MC  .53, .73  .52, .51  .46, .46  .28, -.14  .30, .30  .39, .39 
Central Bank Marginal Costs  0, .01  .03, .03  .03, .03  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Central Bank Marginal Benefits  .07, .33  .03, .03  .03, .03  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
     Net Central Bank MC  -.07, -.32  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0  0, 0 
Comm. Bank Marginal Costs  .07, .31  .12, .12  .12, .12  .34, .65  .27, .35  .27, .35 
Comm. Bank Marginal Benefits  .03, .04  .06, .06  .16, .16  .42, 1.01  .50, .64  .54, .54 
     Net Comm. Bank MC  .03, .27  .06, .06  -.04, -.04  -.09, -.36  -.23, -.29  -.26, -.19 
Table 7. The distribution of private costs and benefits, grocery store transactions ($) 
Notes:  The first and second numbers in each cell correspond to the lower and higher transaction sizes, 
respectively. Numbers may not add due to rounding.  
Source:  Authors’ calculations.  
The table confirms what we already knew: merchants face relatively high net private 
costs for electronic payment methods as compared to paper payments. The costs are driven 
by bank charges. Of course, merchant benefits are not truly zero for each payment method. 
With better data on the benefits of accepting credit cards and avoiding in-house credit 
departments, for instance, the cost ranking would likely change. 
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Consumers, on the other hand, face far higher net private costs for cash and checks as 
compared to cards. In fact, consumers receive net benefits from using credit to pay for 
larger transactions. Consumer private costs are almost entirely time-based for all 
instruments, including such items as the time cost of obtaining cash at an ATM and the 
time cost of processing a payment at the point of sale, both of which favor electronic 
payment methods. Consumer private benefits are driven by cash back for checks at the 
grocery store, which enables consumers to avoid going to an ATM for smaller cash 
purchases. For credit cards, rewards are by far the largest item, although the option value 
of credit is non-trivial for larger purchases. 
Commercial banks, like consumers, receive net benefits from payment cards. In spite 
of the fact that processing costs for payment cards are the largest cost item that banks face, 
since the revenues are larger banks receive net gains. Banks’ net costs for paper 
instruments are quite small--the exception is cash for larger purchases, where the cost is 
driven by the expense of maintaining ATM machines. 
6 Conclusion   
Consumers are gradually moving away from paper payment instruments and toward 
electronic ones, especially payment cards. The implications of the shift toward a cashless 
society are hotly debated. The courts in the United States and regulators in Australia and 
Europe have already made substantial policy interventions in the markets for various 
payment instruments. We believe that this debate needs to be better informed by both 
economic theory and empirical research.  
As a step in that direction, we clarify cost and benefit accounting for payment 
instruments from both a private and a social perspective. The existing empirical literature 
is not adequate for this task for many reasons, chief among them because it typically 
disregards benefits and does not always consider all parties to a transaction. We argue that 
both social costs and social benefits need to be considered when comparing payment 
instruments for policy decisions.  
While the calculations presented here do not cover all costs and benefits, our analysis 
represents a substantial improvement over the existing literature. Conceptually, our 
calculations are fairly straightforward. In practice, the individual cost and benefit 
components are quite difficult to estimate but are crucial for understanding payment 
instrument use. We construct two case studies that focus on the shift away from paper 
instruments and toward payment cards. The case studies present three key findings: 
•  First, transaction size assumptions are critical in analyzing payment-processing 
costs. At smaller transaction sizes, the net social marginal cost of all payment 
instruments – paper and electronic alike – are remarkably similar. No one 
instrument stands out as more socially efficient. At larger transaction sizes, 
however, significant differences emerge. For grocery store transactions, 
electronic payments are considerably less costly on net for society than paper 
methods. Yet another pattern emerges for the larger transactions conducted at 
electronics stores. Here credit cards with a large proportion of reward cardholders 
have the lowest net social marginal cost. This pattern is consistent with observed 
behavior: namely that cash use dominates smaller transaction sizes but drops 
precipitously as transaction size increases. 
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•  Second, retailer type influences the individual cost elements and thus affects 
private cost calculations. Since the distribution of transaction sizes differs across 
venues, this result follows naturally from our first finding. Added to the 
transaction size effect are apparent differences in merchant costs, such as point of 
sale time and back office processing costs.  
•  Finally, and most importantly, the relative merits of different payment methods 
change significantly when all parties are counted and benefits are included. 
Merchant studies have found that paper methods are the cheapest for merchants. 
This is confirmed in our study of the distribution of private costs and benefits. 
But what is cheap for merchants is relatively expensive for other parties to a 
transaction. Certain parties, especially consumers, receive considerable benefits 
from payment cards, which tip their net private costs in favor of that method of 
payment. 
Unfortunately, the case studies also highlight the difficulty of quantifying benefits. For 
instance, while we were able to identify a number of potential benefits for merchants, we 
were unable to quantify any of them. As such, our net social marginal costs should not be 
interpreted as definitive numbers, but rather as illustrative.  
We find that when all key parties to a transaction are considered and benefits are 
added, cash and checks are not as desirable as many earlier studies suggest. In general, the 
shift toward a cashless society appears to improve economic welfare. 
The fact that the shift away from cash and checks is probably economically beneficial 
does not imply that all parties have benefited. Our analysis suggests that certain groups, 
notably consumers, are likely to gain from this shift. In contrast, some merchants may not 
benefit. The distributional implications of the shift away from paper instruments need to be 
examined more carefully.  
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